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Key facts
£3.5bn
face value of the 
loans sold before 
taking account of 
any impairments
£1.7bn
proceeds to the 
government from the 
sale of student loans 
and reduction in public 
sector net debt
411,000
approximate number of 
borrowers whose loans 
have been included in 
the sale
£43 billion face value of all English student loans issued before 2012 
and identifi ed for sale as of March 2017
£12 billion government’s planned proceeds from the initial wave of student 
loan sales between 2017 and 2022
£0.9 billion accounting loss on the Department for Education’s accounts 
resulting from the sale
£0.6 billion estimated net loss of future receipts from student loan repayments 
as a result of the sale
£102 billion face value of all English student loans as of March 2018
£473 billion government forecasts for the face value of all student loans as 
of March 2049 in 2018-19 values
55%–60% government’s long-term estimate of the value of loans that will 
be repaid 
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Summary
Introduction
1 Since 1990 the government has allowed universities and higher education providers 
to charge fees to students. Over time it has also replaced grant-based support with a 
system of student loans. The terms of these loans have changed with time and student 
loan repayments are now based on the level of income students earn after leaving 
higher education.
2 Government’s student loan portfolio is expanding rapidly. The face value of all 
outstanding student loans rose from £89 billion in March 2017 to £102 billion in March 2018. 
The value of outstanding student loans is expected to reach £473 billion by March 2049. 
Government’s long-term estimate is that 55–60% of the loan value will be repaid.
3 In 2013 the government decided to sell a portion of the student loans issued before 
2012. At March 2017, the face value of all outstanding loans issued before 2012 was 
£43 billion. It plans to complete a programme of sales between 2017 and 2022, and 
to raise around £12 billion. In December 2017 the government completed its first sale 
of loans to private investors, consisting of most loans that entered repayment between 
2002 and 2006. 
4 Government had three objectives for the sale:
• to reduce public sector net debt; 
• to ensure there was no detrimental impact on borrowers; and
• to achieve value for money.
5 The Department for Education (the Department) sets student loan policies and 
oversees the administration and collection of student loans by the Student Loans 
Company and HM Revenue & Customs. HM Treasury identified the assets as available 
for sale and UK Government Investments (UKGI), a company wholly owned by 
HM Treasury, managed the sale and acted as the Department’s transaction adviser.
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Study scope
6 In this report we consider the value for money of this sale of student loans and set out:
• the main outcomes of the sale (Part One);
• how government assessed value for money in deciding to sell (Part Two); and
• how UKGI managed the sale (Part Three).
Key findings
Outcomes of the sale
7 The sale of student loans raised £1.7 billion. The government sold the loans of 
over 400,000 borrowers that became eligible for repayment between 2002 and 2006. 
These loans had an outstanding face value – total loans including accrued interest 
and deducting repayments already made – of £3.5 billion repayable up to 2052 
(paragraphs 1.13, 1.14 and Figure 4).
8 Government received less than half the outstanding value of the student 
loans. The government received 48p for every £1 of loans sold which exceeded its 
retention value. When issuing loans, government does not expect to receive all the 
money back. It estimates that for loans issued before 2012, only 65%–70% by value 
will be repaid. Loans in the 2017 sale are expected to have even lower repayment rates 
because they are older loans and nearly half had been repaid in full by the time of the 
sale. Investors also require compensation for taking on risk over future payments due 
to changes in borrowers’ earnings (paragraphs 1.14, 1.15 and Figure 10).
9 The sale of student loans does not affect borrowers. HM Revenue & Customs, 
the Student Loans Company and UKGI will continue to administer loans and collect 
repayments on current terms. Investors will have no contact with borrowers and no 
influence over repayment rates. The government has in effect sold an uncertain stream 
of future repayments in exchange for a lump sum. If government chooses to change 
repayment terms in future or makes specific mistakes in administering the loans it will 
need to compensate investors (paragraphs 1.16 to 1.21).
10 The sale reduces a headline measure of public debt. By selling student loans 
the government reduces its headline debt measure of public sector net debt (PSND). 
This measure does not take account of the loss of future receipts from student loan 
repayments which we estimate at around £604 million. Selling loans for cash therefore 
reduces PSND by the full sale amount of £1.7 billion (paragraphs 1.22 to 1.27, 2.2 to 2.5, 
2.17 Figure 7, Figure 10 and Appendix Three).
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11 Other measures of the sale’s impact show a different effect on government’s 
financial position. For measures which take account of future repayments, the sale 
of student loans crystallises impairments against outstanding loans. For example, 
a measure of public sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL) increased by £1.8 billion 
as a result of the sale. However, PSNFL does not take into account that, when the 
Department issued the loans, it did not expect them to be fully repaid. This subsidy 
explains some of the £1.8 billion loss. The Department previously recorded the loans at 
£2.6 billion in its balance sheet, at a discount to face value but more than the sale value 
of £1.7 billion. It has therefore had to record a loss of £0.9 billion in its 2017-18 accounts. 
While each measure has its limitations, HM Treasury’s objectives for the sale only 
focused on PSND (paragraphs 1.25 to 1.27, Figure 7 and Appendix Three).
Analysis supporting the decision to sell
12 Government aims to retain only those assets that are required to meet its 
public service obligations. This sale falls into a wider programme of asset sales, 
announced in the December 2013 Autumn Statement and 2015 Budget, designed to 
reduce PSND. Government’s current plan is to achieve sale proceeds of around £12 billion 
by 2022 from student loans issued to borrowers starting university between 1998 and 
2012 before considering whether to sell the remaining student loans. As in any asset sale, 
HM Treasury expects the asset-owning department to assess whether a sale should occur 
on value-for-money grounds (paragraphs 1.10, 1.24, 2.3 and Figure 13).
13 The Department was accountable for assessing the value for money of the 
sale; HM Treasury set the value-for-money criteria. In 2007, HM Treasury wrote 
to the then Department for Education & Skills, setting out the value-for-money criteria 
to be applied to a sale of student loans. HM Treasury subsequently agreed the sale 
objectives with the Department and worked with it to understand the impact of different 
sales options. As with other asset sales, HM Treasury’s Green Book set several key 
assumptions used to calculate the monetary value of retaining the student loans, 
which in turn drives the Department’s value-for-money assessment (paragraphs 1.8, 
1.9, 2.2 to 2.5, Figure 3 and Figure 8).
14 The way that government assesses value for money is sensitive to discount 
rates used. In determining the loans’ retention value HM Treasury requires future 
cash flows to be discounted by the Social Time Preference Rate, to reflect that money 
today is worth more than money in the future. This rate is currently higher than market 
interest rates (which affect how investors discount future cash flows) and so selling 
the assets looks attractive for government. In determining the retention value HM 
Treasury also discounts for inflation more heavily than, for example, potential investors 
may do. If market interest rates rise by a few percentage points this could mean that 
market valuations of student loans fall below government’s retention value, preventing 
completion of the planned programme of student loan sales (paragraphs 2.4, 2.6 to 2.15, 
Figure 9 and Figure 10).
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Managing the transaction
15 Once the decision to sell had been made UKGI took a clear approach to 
identifying and selecting options. It reviewed sale options against HM Treasury’s 
objectives, including ensuring that the accounting treatment for the sale removed student 
loans from the government’s balance sheet. Some options which did not ‘declassify’ 
the asset were estimated to achieve a higher transaction value but left risk with the 
government. These options were discarded to achieve the declassification objective. 
A whole loan sale and a securitisation were shortlisted but their associated costs not 
evaluated. UKGI selected a securitisation process, which is a familiar structure for investors 
and maximises potential demand (paragraphs 3.2 to 3.11 and Figure 11 to Figure 14).
16 UKGI ran the sale process effectively and met the tests HM Treasury set for 
the sale process. UKGI conducted extensive market testing to ensure there was an 
appetite for securitised student loans. It provided potential buyers with information to 
understand the underlying assets and price them efficiently, soliciting investor interest 
from just under 200 investors, and holding more than 60 face-to-face meetings. Excess 
demand in the pricing phase allowed UKGI to increase the final sale price from its initial 
estimates (paragraphs 3.12 to 3.21, Figure 3, Figure 15 and Figure 16).
17 UKGI developed a model to help investors value the loans. The model used 
for the Department’s accounts forecasts cash flows for a population with a constant flow 
of new borrowers but is not designed to predict repayment rates for a closed portfolio 
of loans with a fixed group of borrowers. UKGI, therefore, provided investors with a 
bespoke model, developed in conjunction with the Government Actuary’s Department, 
to help investors estimate future cash flows. Comparing this bespoke model against 
historic data suggests it performs within the tolerances the Department expects but 
fluctuates, highlighting the uncertainty in estimating future cash flows (paragraphs 3.14 
to 3.18, Figure 17 and Appendix Four).
18 UKGI sold the student loans at its upper estimate of what the market would 
pay. The government’s retention value is not an indicator of what the market will pay 
for an asset. Following a previous National Audit Office recommendation, UKGI also 
estimated a market value of the loans. The sale price of £1.7 billion was broadly in line 
with UKGI’s estimate of market value (paragraphs 2.6 to 2.15, Figure 9 and Appendix Four).
19 The ultimate value of student loans is uncertain. If the forecasts in UKGI’s model 
are correct, for example on macroeconomic and repayment assumptions, the sale price 
suggests investors collectively will receive a yield to maturity of around 6.5% per year on 
their investment. If UKGI’s model underestimates actual cash flows then investors’ returns 
will increase, likewise if new information reduces investors’ perception of risk, the value 
of the loans may increase in the secondary market. The reverse is also true. Only time 
will tell how the real cash flows compare to those forecast and consequently the buyers’ 
investment return (paragraphs 3.14 to 3.21, Figure 9 and Appendix Four).
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Conclusion on value for money
20 The sale of student loans was conducted under government’s policy to sell assets 
where there is no policy reason for continued public ownership. In this context UKGI 
prepared well for the sale, creating a structure which encouraged investor interest and 
maintained competitive tension during the process. The value of the loans is subject 
to a high level of uncertainty, but UKGI’s estimates of what investors would pay were 
reasonable, and the sale achieved prices at the upper end of these estimates. In terms 
of the preparation, process and proceeds of the transaction itself UKGI has achieved 
value for money. 
21 But the sale of student loans also shows limitations in the way that government 
assesses value for money and measures for the costs of student loans over time. The 
Department uses one set of assumptions for the cost of student loans when they are 
added to government’s balance sheet, and HM Treasury uses another set of assumptions 
in support of its decision to sell them. This offers two different ways of calculating the 
subsidy to, and value of, its rapidly growing student loan portfolio. The two approaches 
give different answers which risks government: not knowing with enough certainty the 
cost to the taxpayer of student loans when they are issued; and of selling assets too 
cheaply relative to their long-term value despite achieving its objective of reducing public 
sector net debt.
Recommendations
22 For any asset which the government intends to dispose of we expect to see the use 
of multiple measures to assess the impact on the government’s current and future financial 
liabilities and a fuller consideration of the financial impact of the sale on government.
23 For future sales of student loans we would expect the Department and UKGI to:
a Include details of the timing and sizing of the remaining programme in the 
transaction approval documents to provide transparency on the future plans 
and their impact;
b Reassess disposal options for every sale, and include considerations about 
the transaction and ongoing costs related to the alternatives; and
c Refine the value-for-money framework applied to calculate the valuations 
as new data on this novel asset class emerges.
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Part One
Overview of the student loans sale
1.1 In this Part we provide background on student loans and the main outcomes of the 
sale. We also set out the impacts of selling student loans on measures of government’s 
assets and liabilities.
The evolution of student loans
1.2 The government introduced student loans in 1990 to encourage people to 
participate in further and higher education. The first loans were mortgage-style loans 
with fixed repayment terms. In September 1998, income-contingent repayment loans 
were introduced instead of the mortgage-style loans. The first repayments were made 
in April 2000.
1.3 Income-contingent loans link repayments to a borrowers’ income. At first, 
the government only provided loans to help cover living costs (maintenance loans), 
but in 2006 it extended the scheme to include tuition fees.
1.4 From 2012, the government began reforming the further education system 
including student finance.1 For student loans, these included changes to the repayment 
threshold (at what income level students start contributing to repayments), the capital 
repayment (how much is repaid), the maturity (when the loans are cancelled) and 
the interest rate (Figure 1). Loans made after this time are reported separately in the 
Department for Education’s (the Department’s) annual accounts.
1.5 The Department is responsible for student loans policy and holds the 
government-owned portfolio of loans. HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) and 
the Student Loans Company collect payments from borrowers.
1 Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Students at the Heart of the System, June 2011.
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Figure 1 shows Key terms for different types of student loans
Figure 1
Key terms for different types of student loans
Terms for student loans have changed over time
Mortgage-style loans 
(issued 1990–1998)
Income contingent 
loans 1
(issued 1998–2012)
Income contingent 
loans 2
(issued after 2012)
Repayment 
threshold 
(from 1 April 2018)
Eligible to defer/postpone 
repayments if earnings are 
under £29,219
£18,330 £25,000
Maturity When the borrower reaches 
50 or 60 – depends if they 
were over/under 40 when the 
last agreement for a student 
loan was made
When the borrower 
reaches 65 
(1998–2006 loans)
25 years 
(2006–2012 loans) 
after loan enters 
repayment
30 years after loan 
enters repayment
Interest rate Charged at an annual rate 
equal to retail price index (RPI)
Lower of RPI and 
bank base rate +1%
In study: 
RPI +3%. 
After study: 
Varies depending 
on income between 
RPI and RPI +3%
Capital 
repayment
Monthly repayment amount 
based on total amount 
borrowed plus interest (based 
on inflation) divided by the 
number of months over which 
repayment is due:
• 60 monthly instalments for 
four or fewer loans before 
1998; and
• 84 monthly instalments 
if five or more loans
Each monthly repayment is 
fixed for 12 months beginning 
in September
9% of income 
above threshold
9% of income 
above threshold
Source: Student Loans Company, UK Government Investments
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Figure 2 shows Key macroeconomic factors affecting student loan repayments
The growth of government’s student loan portfolio
1.6 Government’s student loan portfolio is growing rapidly. The outstanding face value 
of loans2 – taking into account accrued interest and repayments already made – rose 
from £89 billion in March 2017 to £102 billion in March 2018. The Department expects 
it to reach £473 billion by March 2049. 
1.7 The student loan portfolio is a significant public asset. However, future repayments 
are likely to be much less than the face value of the loans. Some borrowers will not 
reach the threshold level of income for repayment and others will not have repaid the 
loan by the time it matures. The government’s long-term estimate is that 55%–60% of 
the value of loans will be repaid. Repayments of loans are uncertain and will also depend 
on economic conditions (Figure 2).
2 Face value is the total outstanding balance of loans issued to students plus any interest that has accrued, 
less any repayments.
Figure 2
Key macroeconomic factors affecting student loan repayments
The main factors affecting repayments are wider economic indicators
Factor Description
Earnings Higher real or nominal earnings increase repayments by:
• increasing the number of borrowers above the repayment threshold; and
• increasing the amount of repayments collected from borrowers.
Employment level Higher employment is expected to increase repayments by increasing the number 
of borrowers in work, some of whom may be above the repayment threshold.
Inflation measured 
by retail price index 
(RPI)
Higher RPI increases balances to be repaid, although it also has a mitigating effect:
• increasing the amount of interest accrued on loans, which increases the total 
size of loans; and
• increasing the repayment threshold (which increases with inflation) and so 
reduces the number of people above the threshold.
Base rate Higher base rate (the interest rate set by the Bank of England) may increase the 
balances to be repaid by:
• increasing the amount of interest accrued on loans, which increases the total 
size of loans if the base rate cap is in place.
Note
1 Impacts here are indicative of expected impacts based on UK Government Investments’ analysis of Income-Contingent 
Loans Plan 1.
Source: Investor presentation, UK Government Investments
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Objectives for selling student loans
1.8 In 2007, HM Treasury and the then Department for Education & Skills, which 
was responsible for student loan assets, began discussing the sale of student loans. 
HM Treasury provided early guidance on the objectives in 2007, and developed them 
together with the Department, which finalised them in 2013. The objectives for the sale 
are to:
• reduce public sector net debt (PSND), while not having a significant impact 
on the public sector current budget; 
• ensure that the sale does not alter the terms of the loans to the borrowers’ 
detriment, or have a negative effect on the operational and policy objectives 
to provide access to higher education; and
• achieve value for money, and have a reasonable expectation of being repeated. 
1.9 Government has a wider policy not to hold assets unless there is a policy reason 
for continued public ownership. HM Treasury was concerned with the growth in 
the loan book and the resulting exposure of public finances to the risks within the 
portfolio. This concern is reflected in the first objective (reduce PSND). The remaining 
two objectives relate to: the Sale of Student Loans Act 2008;3 and part of principles 
of regularity and propriety the responsible accounting officer is required to follow as 
set out in Managing Public Money.
The student loans sale programme
1.10 Plans for the sale of student loans took several years to develop (Figure 3 overleaf). 
This long development period was affected by the parliamentary timetable, elections, 
changes in government, the financial crisis and the decision to leave the European 
Union. Because of the novel nature of the asset, significant work was also required to 
develop and refine the best way to achieve the sale’s objectives.
1.11 The government intends to sell loans from the first wave of income-contingent 
student loans (issued between 1998 and 2012) in a programme of sales over the course 
of 2017–2022. In March 2017 the total face value of these loans was £43 billion and the 
government aims to sell around £3.5 billion to £4.9 billion in face value of loans each 
year, raising around £12 billion in proceeds. 
1.12 Estimates of sales proceeds have been communicated to the Office for Budget 
Responsibility and appear in national debt forecasts. Although the programme of sales 
has been announced, there was limited detail in the business case and no specific 
details on the loan portfolios to be sold or the timing of sales have been communicated 
to investors.
1.13 The government announced the first sale within the programme in February 2017, 
and completed the sale in December 2017.
3 The Sale of Student Loans Act 2008 provides the legal basis for selling student loans, and requires government to treat 
sold and unsold loans in the same way.
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Figure 3 shows Timeline of events for selling student loans
Figure 3
Timeline of events for selling student loans
The first sale of student loans took place in 2017
Key events leading up to the sale
April 1990 The Education (Student Loans) Act 1990 introduces the student loan scheme.
July 1998 The Teaching and Higher Edcucation Act 1998 introduces income-contingent 
student loans.
March 2007 HM Treasury (HMT) and Department for Education & Skills start discussing sale 
objectives and value-for-money framework for a future sale.
July 2008 The Sale of Student Loans Act 2008 provides the legal basis for student loans 
to be sold.
May 2010 – 
July 2013
Feasibility study – the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) appointed 
advisers to identify options for a future sale announced in June 2010 Budget.
August 2013 – 
May 2014
BIS appointed advisers to prepare for a sale. HMT confirms announcement in 
December 2013 Autumn Statement but in May 2014 ministers decide to postpone 
market testing to the following Parliament. A limited internal programme continues 
in order to ensure the project is in a position to provide the next government with 
the option of conducting and completing a sale.
June 2015 – 
January 2017
Ministers decide to proceed with the sale and HMT announces and confirms 
intention to sell in Spending Review and Autumn Statement announcements 
in 2015 and 2016. Sale preparations are relaunched.
February 2017 Government announces the first sale of the income-contingent student loans as 
part of a sales programme. Intended completion by May 2017. Sales programme 
relates only to loans issued before 2012.
April 2017 The first sale was put on hold during purdah as an election had been announced.
Timeline of the sale process
31 October 2017 The sale is relaunched after some market testing of investor interest.
28 November 2017 Initial price thoughts are announced and Joint Lead Managers start building 
an order book.
4 December 2017 Department for Education (DfE) and UK Government Investments (UKGI) agree 
that Joint Lead Managers can release price guidance to investors.
6 December 2017 DfE and UKGI agree to a price on the securities with investors.
13 December 2017 Sale completes with securities being issued to investors and HMT receiving 
the proceeds. 
2018–2022 Further sales of pre-2012 student loans anticipated.
Notes
1 Multiple departments were responsible for student loans during this time. These include the Department for Education 
& Skills, the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills and the Department for Education. 
2 Names and roles of external parties, such as fi nancial advisers or Joint Lead Managers, are detailed in Figure 17.
Source: UK Government Investments, National Audit Offi ce analysis
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Figure 4 shows Key facts about the loans sold
The first sale of student loans
1.14 The first sale consisted of loans made to borrowers that became eligible for 
repayment between 2002 and 2006.4 The loans relate to around 411,000 borrowers 
and had a total face value of £3.5 billion in March 20165 (Figure 4). 
1.15 The Department sold the loans for £1.7 billion to private investors. This suggests 
that government received 48p for every £1 of loans sold. This is less than the estimate in 
its latest accounts that 65%–70% of the value of loans issued before 2012 will be repaid. 
This is partly explained by the loans in this sale having a longer repayment history: nearly 
half had been repaid in full by the time of the sale, reducing the average repayment rate 
expected in the remaining pool of loans. Sale proceeds are also affected by the discounts 
applied by investors for risk, given the novel nature of the asset.
4 Repayments will only commence if the borrower’s income is above a certain threshold.
5 Due to the tax collection and reporting cycle of student loans, the face value as at March 2016 is the most accurate 
for the sold loans.
Figure 4
Key facts about the loans sold 
60% of borrowers are earning above the repayment threshold in 2015-16
Description Value
Face value £3,547m
Carrying/book value £2,584m5
Sale price £1,719m6
Number of borrowers
Weighted average age of borrower
Weighted average term to maturity 
(borrower=65)
411,000 approximate 
37 years old
28 years 
Average balance per borrower £8,626
Average annual repayment £885
Percentage of borrowers that made 
a repayment during 2015-16
60%
Notes
1 Face value is the total outstanding balance of loans issued to students plus any interest that has accrued, 
less any repayments.
2 The carrying value refl ects the amount the Department expects to receive from the loans given out to students 
and interest it accumulated over time, discounted at a rate determined by accounting standards. 
3 The face value and carrying value excludes 5% that is retained by the Department in order to comply with 
European securitisation regulations. 
4 All data are as at end of the 2015-16 fi nancial year unless otherwise stated.
5 Value as at March 2016, using data available at March 2018.
6 Value as at December 2017.
Source: Investor presentation, Prospectus, UK Government Investments
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Impact on borrowers
1.16 Borrowers are unaffected by the sale of student loans. The Department’s sale 
arrangements mean that the Secretary of State for Education is responsible for collecting 
repayments on behalf of investors. The Department carries out this obligation through a 
‘Master Servicer’ function. The Secretary of State has delegated this function to:
• HM Revenue & Customs and the Student Loans Company for collecting 
repayments from borrowers; and
• UK Government Investments (UKGI, a wholly owned entity within HM Treasury) 
and the Student Loans Company for transaction-specific activities such as 
reporting information to investors. 
1.17 The Department is only selling the rights to the future cash flows from the loans 
and so borrowers will experience no change in either repayment terms or collection 
processes (Figure 5). They will have no contact with investors, and investors will pay 
a fee to the Department for performing the Master Servicer function. The Department 
distributes this fee to those performing the function. This means there is no additional 
privatisation benefit from the sale, as the new owners cannot invest in the asset to, 
for example, make collecting repayments more efficient and improve returns.
Risk in the administration of student loans
1.18 The activities carried out under the Master Servicer function are similar to those 
the government has performed in the past, in particular in relation to collecting cash, 
but the external reporting function is new. There are risks to performing both aspects, 
such as failure of software or systems for collecting and administering the loans. If these 
materialise, are detrimental to investors and cannot be rectified, the government may be 
liable to compensate investors.
1.19 The arrangements for the sale also include a number of warranties and indemnities 
that give rise to contingent liabilities for government, which the Department has 
disclosed to Parliament.6 These warranties and indemnities principally aim to protect 
investors should the Master Servicer function not perform as expected or should 
government make policy changes that are to investors’ detriment. For example, should 
government change the threshold at which students repay loans, UKGI estimates 
that for loans sold at an illustrative £2 billion today, a 20% increase in the repayment 
threshold in five years may result in compensation payments to investors of £160 million 
over the remaining life of the transaction.
6 Departmental Minute from the Department for Education on behalf of government, Notification of sale of student loans, 
October 2017.
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Figure 5 shows Overview of ongoing cash flows and reporting requirements
Figure 5
Overview of ongoing cash fl ows and reporting requirements
Employers on behalf 
of PAYE borrowers
Notes
1 SLC – Student Loans Company, HMRC – HM Revenue & Customs.
2 Other borrowers consist of those who make direct repayments and voluntary repayments.
Source: Prospectus
Loans will continue to be collected via HMRC and SLC
HM Revenue & 
Customs (collects 
96% of payments)
Department 
for Education 
(Secretary of State)
Issuer (special 
purpose vehicle 
for securitisation)
Investors
Self-assessment 
borrowers
Overseas borrowers SLC (collects 4% of 
payments directly)
Other borrowers
Cash flow
Reporting
UK Government 
Investments
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Figure 6 shows Master Servicer governance arrangements
1.20 UKGI and the Department completed internal and external testing of the systems 
and controls in place and concluded that these risks are remote. UKGI estimated 
that if 10% of repayments were not collected and this was undetected for five years, 
compensation could amount to £50 million.
1.21 The Department and UKGI also put in place governance arrangements surrounding 
the Master Servicer function to minimise risks (Figure 6). The arrangements have been 
tailored to the activities the Master Servicer performs, but the board membership does 
not include independent representatives.
Figure 6
Master Servicer governance arrangements
The Master Servicer board does not include independent members
Governance arrangements – Master Servicer board
• is accountable within government for ensuring that all Master Servicer functions are 
discharged by DfE as Master Servicer;
• is a point of escalation for any issues/decisions that are outside the remit of the Master 
Servicer working group;
• meets quarterly or in extraordinary circumstances; and
• is chaired by a DfE senior civil servant (on behalf of Secretary of State for Education 
as Master Servicer) and formed of professionals from SLC, HMRC and UKGI.
Governance arrangements – Master Servicer working group
• is responsible for day-to-day management of the Master Servicer and delegates functions 
to HMRC and SLC; 
• oversees the discharge of the government’s annual responsibilities regarding predictable, 
cyclical events (such as data reporting to investors);
• is the first body to discuss any emerging issues or risks, and escalate these as 
appropriate; and
• holds monthly meetings, which are chaired by UKGI (head of Master Servicer) and attended 
by SLC, HMRC and DfE.
Note
1 SLC – Student Loans Company, DfE – Department for Education, UKGI – UK Government Investments, 
HMRC – HM Revenue & Customs.
Source: UK Government Investments, Prospectus, full business case
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Figure 7 shows Impact of student loan sale under different accounting treatments
Impacts on government’s financial position
1.22 The impact of the sale on government’s overall financial position depends on the 
measure chosen. There is no single measure of financial impact and different measures 
treat the £1.7 billion proceeds of the sale very differently (Figure 7).
Figure 7
Impact of student loan sale under different accounting treatments
Public sector net debt is reduced by £1.7 billion and public sector net financial liabilities is 
increased by £1.8 billion
National accounts Departmental 
accounts
PSND
(£bn)
PSNFL
(£bn)
DfE accounts
(£bn)
Initial impact of loan issuance 4.2
increase 
in debt
0.0 2.8 
increase 
in assets
Impact of the sale Value of student loans 
recognised (at the 
time of the sale) 
(A)
– 3.5
asset
2.6 
asset
Proceeds from the sale
(B)
1.7 
increase 
in cash
1.7 
increase 
in cash
1.7
increase
in cash
Impact of sale
(B–A)
1.7 
decrease 
in debt
1.8
increase 
in liabilities 
0.9
write-off
Impact if no sale 
(at maturity)
– 0.3 to 1.0 
cancellation 
avoided
0.0
Notes
1 PSND – public sector net debt; PSND does not include future repayments as assets offsetting debt. At initial 
issuance, it records the amount paid out to borrowers. At a sale, it only records the amount received from the sale. 
No impact if no sale occurs.
2 PSNFL – public sector net fi nancial liabilities; PSNFL includes future repayments as offsetting future liabilities. 
At initial issuance, it records both the amounts paid out to students and the full nominal value of the loans – these 
net each other off. At a sale, it records the proceeds from the sale against the nominal value of the loans. If no sale 
occurs, the outstanding amounts are cancelled.
3 DfE accounts – Department for Education accounts. At initial issuance, DfE records the loans at face value less an 
initial impairment (the Resource Accounting and Budgeting charge) to refl ect that not all loans will be repaid. At a sale, 
it records the proceeds from the sale against the carrying value of the loans. If no sale occurs, assuming the ongoing 
impairment charges are accurate, no further write-off occurs. 
Source: Department for Education Annual Report and Accounts 2017-18; National Audit Offi ce analysis of HM Treasury 
debt and liability measures, Offi ce for National Statistics
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1.23 HM Treasury’s primary measure for the sale is public sector net debt (PSND). 
PSND is part of the National Accounts compiled by the Office for National Statistics 
and includes cash or near-cash government assets and liabilities. PSND excludes 
illiquid assets such as student loan repayments. The effect of the sale is therefore 
recorded as a £1.7 billion reduction in PSND.
1.24 The sale of student loans also allows HM Treasury to avoid future write-offs of 
student loan repayments. Under the National Accounts unpaid student loans would 
be written off at maturity. The 2017 sale allows HM Treasury to avoid £0.3 billion to 
£1 billion in write-offs over the term of the loans.7 The planned programme of sales up 
to 2022 would reduce PSND by £12 billion and the National Accounts would avoid future 
write-offs of £13 billion.
1.25 The impact on PSND is due to the exclusion of future repayments from the 
calculation of government assets. Alternative measures such as public sector net 
financial liabilities (PSNFL) include these repayments, and the effect of the sale is very 
different. By selling £3.5 billion in loans for £1.7 billion, the government has in effect 
crystallised a loss of £1.8 billion under the PSNFL measure. However, PSNFL does not 
show the Department’s planned subsidy of student loans – when the Department issued 
the loans, it did not expect them all to be repaid. This subsidy explains some of the 
£1.8 billion loss.
1.26 Although PSNFL was introduced in 2016, before the full business case for 
selling the loans was produced in early 2017, it was not considered alongside the sale 
objectives. If the government were to assess the impact of the sale on the national 
accounts using PSNFL rather than PSND the decision to sell would not have been 
so clear-cut.
1.27 The impact on the sale on the Department’s accounts is different again. Unlike 
PSNFL, the Department already marks down the value of student loans to take account 
of future unpaid loans. The £3.5 billion of loans was ‘carried’ at a value of £2.6 billion in 
the Department’s 2016-17 accounts.8 In the Department’s accounts the sale requires a 
further write-down of £0.9 billion to take account of the difference between the ‘carrying 
value’ of the loans and sale proceeds. We discuss the accounting treatment of the sale 
in more detail in Appendix Three.
7 The figures are based on two valuation methodologies and are uncertain. Based on the methodology in the 
department’s accounts the expected write-off is £1 billion; based on the methodology used in the sale valuation 
the expected write-off is £0.3 billion.
8 The carrying value reflects the amount the Department expects to receive from the loans given out to students 
and interest it accumulated over time, discounted at a rate determined by accounting standards.
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Part Two
Assessing the value for money of the sale
2.1 In this Part we consider the student loan sale objectives and how government 
assessed the value for money of the sale. We also consider how the government 
determined the retention value for the loans.
Government’s value for money framework
2.2 In addition to the objectives to reduce public sector net debt and avoid detriment 
to borrowers, HM Treasury required the sale of student loans to achieve value for money 
and have a reasonable expectation of repeating this for the remaining programme.
2.3 Because determining the value for money of selling student loans is not self-evident, 
HM Treasury set out a value-for-money framework to clarify how its Green Book guidance 
should be applied. It agreed this with the Department for Education (the Department) 
in 2013. The final framework consists of three tests:
• the Department should satisfy itself that an efficient market exists for this asset 
and that this market appears to be functioning efficiently at the time of sale; 
• the Department should ensure that sales are structured and executed in such 
a way as to promote efficient pricing; and 
• the sale price needs to exceed or be broadly neutral when compared with the 
retention value to government.
These are very similar to the tests HM Treasury suggested in 2007 when it first identified 
these loans could be sold (see paragraph 1.8). 
Responsibilities for value for money within government 
2.4 The Department ‘owns’ student finance policy and the associated student loan 
assets; it is therefore accountable for the sale. It delegated implementation of the sale 
to UK Government Investments (UKGI) as the ‘centre of excellence’ for asset sales in 
government. A UKGI official acted as the senior responsible officer for the transaction.
2.5 UKGI worked closely with key stakeholders, including the Department, the Student 
Loans Company (SLC), and HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC). HM Treasury was involved 
at all stages of the transaction. Figure 8 overleaf provides a simplified overview of the 
key parties’ responsibilities and the internal assurance process that was in place.
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Figure 8 shows Main parties involved in the first sale of student loans
Figure 8
Main parties involved in the fi rst sale of student loans
UK Government Investments acted as senior responsible owner (SRO) for the December 2017
sale of student loans
Party Roles
Department for Education
(Accounting officer)
• Responsible for sale
• Working team involved in all key work streams but main focus on 
strategy, finance and analysis
• Set sale objectives alongside HMT
• DfE’s ongoing obligations after the sale, as Master Servicer, have 
mostly been delegated to UKGI, HMRC and SLC
UKGI
(SRO)
• Appointed by DfE and responsible for delivering the sale in 
accordance with the objectives and framework set
• Project lead for the sale
• Coordinated with all parties
• Have continuing obligations to investors as a result of Master 
Servicer function
HM Treasury • Set sale objectives alongside DfE and government’s 
value-for-money framework
• Attended weekly meetings
• Part of the project board and the senior-level cross-government 
steering group responsible for the project
Student Loans Company • Provided data that fed into the model used to calculate 
future repayments
• Received external assurance on process and data quality 
• Will continue to service both sold and unsold loans
• Will collect and compile information and repayments to be sent 
to investors
HM Revenue & Customs • Provided data that fed into the model used to calculate 
future repayments
• Will continue to collect repayments for both sold and unsold loans
Assurance • Multiple boards and steering groups
• Internal audit
•  Infrastructure and Projects Authority assurance and gateway reviews 
(part of government major projects portfolio)
• HMT approval process panel
Notes
1 HMT – HM Treasury, DfE – Department for Education, UKGI – UK Government Investments, SLC – Student Loans 
Company, HMRC – HM Revenue & Customs.
2 External advisers – see Figure 17. 
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis, UK Government Investments, full business case
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Assessing government’s valuation of student loans
2.6 One of HM Treasury’s value-for-money tests is to ensure that the “sale price 
exceeds or is broadly neutral to” the government’s value of holding the asset, known 
as the retention value. Repayments are uncertain and any student loan valuation must 
make a series of assumptions about future payments as well as discounting future 
cash flows so that they can be compared with sale proceeds today. Below we set out 
how government calculated its retention value, and compare this to other approaches 
to valuing student loans.
Calculating the government’s retention value
2.7 The first step was for UKGI to estimate repayments from student loans. It used 
a financial model of future cash flows, which we discuss in more detail in paragraphs 
3.14 to 3.18. It then developed an approach to discounting those future cash flows so 
that they could be compared with expected or actual sale proceeds.
2.8 UKGI’s discount rate consisted of several elements:
• A social time preference rate. HM Treasury’s Green Book guidance recommends 
discounting future cash flows by a social time preference rate that reflects the value 
to society of cash today rather than in the future. HM Treasury sets this rate at 2.5%.9
• Expected inflation. The social time preference rate is a real rate, so to account 
for inflation UKGI used the retail price index (RPI), which was 3% at the time. 
Together, the nominal social time preference rate was therefore 5.5%.
• An asset-specific risk premium. The Green Book guidance recommends adding 
an asset-specific risk premium to the nominal social time preference rate to reflect 
that cash flows are uncertain.10
2.9 UKGI asked the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD) to estimate the 
asset-specific risk. GAD’s analysis resulted in a wide range for the risk premium because 
student loans have limited relevant data with which to accurately predict future payments 
and how market participants might value those payments. GAD therefore estimated the 
asset specific risk using a theoretical approach, which depends critically on a number 
of assumptions.11 It noted that “whilst some of these assumptions could be reasonably 
challenged, [it did] not believe that such challenges prevent the use [in a valuation]”.
9 The social time preference rate is 3.5%, which was adjusted down by 1% to remove the catastrophe risk element 
to prevent any double-counting when the asset risk premium is added.
10 We do not disclose this asset risk premium as it is potentially commercially sensitive. It could give investors information 
about the government’s minimum retention value and therefore minimum sale price, affecting future loan sales.
11 The theoretical approach is based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model.
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Comparison with other valuations of student loans
2.10 The government retention value calculated by UKGI can be compared with several 
other valuations of student loans including:
• a sale valuation, an estimate of how a potential buyer is likely to value student 
loans. We have previously recommended that UKGI calculates sale valuations 
to ensure that the retention value is informed by prices that may be achieved 
in competitive market conditions;12
• the actual sale proceeds, from which we can infer some of the investor 
assumptions in valuing student loans; and
• the carrying value of loans on the Department’s accounts. The value of 
£2.6 billion is in accordance with international accounting standards.
2.11 Each approach to valuing student loans results in different estimates. To a large 
extent these differences reflect the way that future cash flows are discounted. The higher 
the discount rate used, the lower the value of future payments in today’s terms, and the 
lower the valuation. Figure 9 compares the discount rates used in each approach.
2.12 UKGI’s sale valuation used a similar approach to the retention value of discounting 
future cash flows. However, prospective buyers do not use a predefined discount 
rate such as the social time preference rate as their hurdle rate, and instead tend to 
use actual yield on government bonds, which is referred to as the risk-free rate. UKGI 
estimated this as the yield on 12-year government bonds,13 which offered a 1.6% 
nominal return at the time of valuation.
2.13 UKGI then added the asset risk premium calculated by GAD, plus an additional 
novelty premium. This novelty premium can be considered as a discount observed 
when a company first lists its shares on the stock market. In the NAO’s report on 
‘The Privatisation of Royal Mail’ the government’s advisers estimated this discount to 
be in the range of 5% to 15%. UKGI estimates most of this novelty premium to disappear 
within five years as the market becomes more familiar with the asset class. The Green 
Book does not require government to be compensated for the novelty premium.
2.14 Actual sale proceeds can be used to infer the total return investors required to buy 
the loans from the government. Assuming the government’s base case economic forecast 
as of March 2017, this return is equivalent to an average return of 6.5% when taking into 
account the securitisation structure. Assuming investors used a 1.6% risk-free rate, this 
implies that the asset premium plus any novelty discount investors required was 4.9%.
12 UKGI calculated four different valuations – two retention valuations and two sale valuations. For simplicity we only focus 
on one in each category.
13 UKGI used the 12-year UK government bonds because it has the most comparable weighted average life (duration) 
as the sold loans.
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Figure 9 shows Overview of valuation methodologies and discount rates
Figure 9
Overview of valuation methodologies and discount rates
The higher discount rate used means that government’s retention value leads to the lowest valuation
Type Valuation 
methodology
Risk-free 
rate
(%)
Asset risk 
premium
(%)
Total 
discount rate
(%)
Value
 
(£bn)
Retention 
value
Discounted 
cash flows
5.5 Undisclosed >6.5 <1.7
Sale valuation Discounted 
cash flows (plus 
novelty premium)
1.6 Undisclosed >6.5 ≤1.7
Accounting 
valuation
HM Treasury’s 
Government 
Financial 
Reporting 
Manual 2017-18
– – [3.8] 2.6
Actual sale Average actual 
yield based on 
price paid
1.6 4.9 6.5 1.7
Notes
1 The Department’s accounting valuation used a discount rate of retail price index (RPI) +0.7%, with RPI at 3.1%. 
The Department also used a different model from the other valuations for future repayments.
2 The discounted cash fl ow valuation methodology fi rst estimates the future cash fl ows of an asset and then 
discounts them to arrive at present value estimate. The future cash fl ows of all the valuations stated above are 
estimated by the transaction-based earnings & repayment model (TERM) model (see paragraphs 3.17 to 3.19 for 
more details on the TERM model). Each type of valuation applies a different total discount rate to these cash fl ows.
3 The risk-free rate is the return an investor can achieve on a government bond with a similar maturity, for the 
retention value it is a hurdle rate.
4 The asset risk premium is the minimum return by which the expected return on a risky asset must exceed the 
known return on a risk-free asset.
5 The ‘Total discount rate’ used in the ‘Actual sale’ is the estimated weighted average yield investors may receive 
based on the prices investors paid for the notes, the characteristics of the notes, the TERM model and the 
government’s base case macro-economic forecast as of March 2016. This average yield is based on the cash fl ows 
to investors based on the securitisation structure – the equivalent yield excluding the securitisation structure is 7.1%. 
The difference is due to the timing of cash fl ows.
Source: Full business case, Department for Education Annual Reports and Accounts 2017-18, National Audit Offi ce analysis
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The impact of the government’s retention value
2.15 Government’s retention value was conservative. The application of the Green 
Book methodology meant that the government’s retention value was lower compared 
with: what investors were likely to pay; and how the Department valued the loans in its 
accounts. The main differences resulted from:
• the use of the social time preference rate according to the Green Book 
methodology of 5.5% instead of the return on government bonds of 1.6%. 
The discount rate used in the accounting valuation is also lower at 3.8%;
• the use of RPI of 3% to calculate a nominal social time preference rate. RPI is the 
inflation measure used for setting the interest rate students pay on loans, but is 
increasingly criticised and seen as a non-standard inflation measure. The more 
common Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation measure stood at 2%; assuming 
no other changes, using this measure would have increased the retention value 
by around £110 million; and
• the methodology applied to estimate the future cash flows differed from the 
one used in the accounts. While it was a more appropriate methodology for the 
assets sold, it resulted in £261 million less cash flows than the forecast used in 
the Departmental accounts (paragraphs 3.14 to 3.18 and Appendix Four).
2.16 Assumptions about cash flows and the discount rate are inevitably subject to 
a high degree of uncertainty and judgement. However, government’s approach to 
calculating the retention value could create unintended risks to the planned sale of 
student loans if economic conditions change. For example, a rise of a few percentage 
points in the cost of government borrowing would decrease the sale valuation (and 
investors’ willingness to pay) below the retention value. Should such an increase occur 
by 2021-22 it could put the current sale programme at risk, reducing sale proceeds at 
the same time that the cost of funding through government borrowing is rising.
2.17 Although we do not reveal government’s exact retention value for commercial 
reasons, we can use the actual proceeds from the sale to estimate the impact of 
differences between discounting in UKGI’s retention value and the Department’s 
accounts (Figure 10). Given that the sale went ahead you can assume that the retention 
value is at or below the actual proceeds. The figure shows that the estimated net loss of 
future receipts from student loan repayments in selling the assets is around £604 million. 
This is calculated by comparing the sale price to future receipts; the latter derived from 
government’s macroeconomic sale model discounted to a present value using the same 
rates as the Departmental accounts.
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Figure 10 shows Accounting for the first sale of student loans
Figure 10
Accounting for the first sale of student loans
Differences in discount rate account for £604 million
Notes
1 Face value is the total outstanding balance of loans issued to students plus any interest that has accrued, less any repayments. 
This is as at March 2016. 
2 Impairment has been recognised by the Department over time. It reflects the Department’s assessment of the amount it does not expect to 
receive back from borrowers. 
3 The carrying value reflects the amount the Department expects to receive from the loans issued to borrowers and interest it accumulated
over time, discounted at a rate determined by accounting standards. This is as at March 2016, using data available at March 2018.
4 The face value and carrying value excludes 5% that is retained by the Department to comply with EU securitisation requirements.
5 The difference in the cash flows are from the two models (the transaction-based earnings and repayments model versus the stochastic
earnings pathway, see paragraphs 3.17 to 3.19). The 65 pence per pound relates to the carrying value less the cash flow differences. 
6 The discounting differences is due to the different discount rates used and the model’s macroeconomic assumptions, and not on 
investor assumptions. Therefore, the split between the cash flows and return rates for investors may be different (see paragraphs 2.11 to 2.13). 
Source: Full business case, Department for Education Annual Reports and Accounts 2017-18, National Audit Office analysis
Face value
Impairment
Carrying value
Cash flow differences
Discounting differences
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000
Amount (£m)
Value
Accounting loss
3,547
Selling price
3,500
963
2,584
261
604
1,719 865
Reduction
100p
73p
65p
48p
Pence per pound 
of student loans
28 Part Three The sale of student loans
Part Three
Managing the sale
3.1 In this Part we consider how UK Government Investments (UKGI) prepared 
and managed the sale to meet the objectives both in terms of the sale’s accounting 
treatment and efficiency tests for the transaction. We also consider how UKGI set up, 
structured and managed the sale process.
Considering options for the sale
3.2 The first step was to select the method for selling student loans. In 2010, 
the Department for Education (the Department) engaged advisers to conduct 
a sale feasibility study and identify disposal options (Figure 11).
3.3 The Department’s advisers conducted detailed analysis of the disposal options. 
The Department’s main selection criteria were whether a sale could achieve a 
reduction in public sector net debt (PSND); and, the loans could be declassified from 
the government’s balance sheet. It identified that some options might achieve higher 
proceeds, but this came at increased risk of failure and would not have achieved the 
declassification objective so they were not evaluated further. The additional proceeds 
and risk were not quantified.
3.4 In 2013, when financial markets had improved, the sale adviser recommended 
proceeding with one of two options: a whole loan sale or a securitisation which bundled 
loans together and sold off cash flows in tranches. Neither approach would affect 
borrowers’ terms or the process of collecting repayments. UKGI and the Department 
evaluated both options comprehensively in the full business case for selling student 
loans in January 2017 and reassessed key aspects prior the launch in October 2017.
3.5 The Department and UKGI concluded that the securitisation structure was the 
better option. Market testing had shown that demand and early pricing indications for 
a whole loan sale were lower. In addition, a securitisation could reach a wider range of 
investors, which would increase competitive tension.
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3.6 The execution of securitisation is more complicated and costly. The process of 
securitising the cash flows requires more parties to be involved in the sale process, for 
example rating agencies, as well as a wider scope of work. In addition, the Department 
must keep a material economic interest in the transaction of no less than 5% of the 
asset sold.14 This increases the cost and resources required to execute a securitisation, 
but it did not affect the choice of options.15 
The securitisation structure
3.7 Securitisation is a financial process in which cash flows from a series of assets 
such as student loans are pooled together and then divided into tranches (Figure 12). 
The tranches are similar to fixed income securities like bonds. The holders of each 
tranche are paid according to set rules such as maturity (when the principal will be 
repaid), coupon (how much interest is paid, and when) and priority in the payment of 
interest and repayment of principal. Each tranche has a different set of characteristics 
and risks associated with them and therefore attract a wide range of investors. 
3.8 The priority in the payment of interest and principal is a distinguishing factor in 
securitisations, which results in some tranches with a low level of risk (with lower returns) 
and others with a high level of risk (with higher returns). The highest-risk tranche is 
sometimes known as the equity tranche since holders will only be paid after all other 
tranches in the event that cash flows are high enough.
3.9 UKGI and the sale adviser designed the capital structure to maximise expected 
proceeds considering the long-term riskiness of the loans sold (Figure 13 on page 32). 
UKGI set the tranches and their characteristics in order to minimise the equity tranche 
(the X-note). Advisers confirmed, based on significant market testing, that the final 
structure was the most efficient structure for the pool of loans sold. In addition, UKGI 
tested investors’ interest in a whole loan sale before the final launch, and had no 
indication that it would achieve a better price. A better price would be an indication that a 
third party, which is likely to use a securitisation as well, could structure it more efficiently.
3.10 Tranches A1, A2 and B represent the lower risk tranches in the securitisation. 
The tranches have some novel characteristics but there are sufficient comparable 
securities which investors can use to make an assessment of the price and therefore 
return on the investment. The higher risk X-note, however, has no direct comparable 
securities, and the uncertainty of the future cash flows makes it difficult to price this 
tranche. This is reflected in the low pricing of this tranche in the securitisation structure 
(Figure 14 on page 32 and Figure 16 on page 35).
14 Capital Requirement Directive IV.
15 The cost differential between a securitisation and a whole loan sale is difficult to estimate. Some advisers such as credit 
rating agencies would not be required, but most other advisers would. These would perform a similar function although 
the scope of their work might be reduced.
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Figure 13 shows Details of the tranches in the securitisation structure
Figure 14 shows Comparable securities for the individual tranches
Figure 13
Details of the tranches in the securitisation structure
The A1, A2 and B notes are listed, the X-note is not
Tranches Face value  Proceeds
(£m)
Credit rating Duration
(Years)
Coupon
(%)(£m) (%)
A1 810.60 22.85 803 A 2.9 12-month Libor
+1
A2 697.10 19.65 649 A 11.5 2.5
B 120.60 3.40 104 BBB 12.5 LPI 
+1.45
X 1,919.10 54.10 163 Not rated N/A 0.5
Total 3,547.40 100 1,719 
Notes
1 Face value is outstanding balance of the loans as of March 2016 including accrued interest and after deducting 
repayments made.
2 Credit rating is based on S&P and Fitch ratings, which were the same for each tranche at the time of pricing.
3 Duration is not at a fi xed maturity date of the tranches but rather the average weighted life of the cash fl ows in 
the tranche.
4 Coupon is the interest rate paid to investors.
5 Notes are listed in the level of priority of payment (A1 fi rst, X last).
6 Certain features in the notes are novel in the securitisation market, in particular, A1 note linked to 12-month Libor 
as opposed to one- or three-month Libor, A2 notes having a scheduled amortisation, B notes being infl ation-linked.
Source: Investor presentation, UK Government Investments
Figure 14
Comparable securities for the individual tranches
The X-note has no direct comparators and represents more than half of the securitisation structure
Tranches Percentage of 
total face value
(%)
Most appropriate comparators
A1 22.85 Traditional asset-backed securities, buy-to-let mortgage-backed 
securities and non-conforming residential-backed securities
A2 19.65 Long-dated, fixed-rate bonds with exposure to the UK economy
B 3.40 Index-linked bonds with exposure to UK economy
X 54.10 No direct comparable securities. Advisers expected equity return 
requirements of the target investors – alternative asset managers 
and private equity funds
Notes
1 Tranches – each tranche is a fi nancial security which offers investors a return over a certain period at a certain 
level of risk.
2 Percentage of total face value – each tranche has a certain size relative to the total face value of the loans sold.
3 Most appropriate comparators – this is a list of fi nancial securities with similar characteristics. 
Source: Full business case, National Audit Offi ce analysis of sales adviser report
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3.11 Uncertainty about the future cash flows also creates a possibility that investors 
will fare much better than expected. In order to allow government to benefit from 
an increase in the value of the X-note, this tranche includes a five-year profit sharing 
mechanism whereby the government is entitled to 50% of the profit from any sale above 
a predefined threshold. The threshold is set at 1.25 times the expected return investors 
expected at pricing of the notes. The expected return at pricing was 13.1%. Should such 
outperformance occur, the mechanism is unlikely to kick-in materially, as the investment 
horizon of investors may be longer than five years.
Supporting market and price efficiency
3.12 As part of HM Treasury’s value-for-money tests the Department must satisfy itself 
that an efficient market exists for student loans and that it is functioning efficiently at the 
time of sale. If markets are not efficient – either because the market is under-developed, 
investors have insufficient information about the asset, or because there is insufficient 
competition – proceeds are likely to be affected negatively. UKGI and its advisers took 
a number of steps to meet HM Treasury’s tests for market and price efficiency.
Assessing market demand
3.13 Advisers perceived market conditions between October and December 2017 to 
be supportive of a sale launch despite some uncertainty in the UK’s macroeconomic 
outlook which might lead investors to be cautious. The advisers indicated that excess 
demand for similar ‘asset-backed securities’ meant issuers were achieving good prices 
for the assets. And while advisers expected supply to increase by the year end, they did 
not expect the fundamental imbalance to change. 
Giving investors adequate information
3.14 To promote efficient pricing, investors need sufficient information to make an 
accurate judgement of the fair value of the loans for sale based on an analysis of their 
risk and return characteristics. With poor information investors are likely to place a higher 
risk premium on novel assets and proceeds would be lower. 
3.15 After the transaction announcement, UKGI and its advisers provided investors with 
information about the loans and the transaction via a virtual data room. This is standard 
for this type of transaction. 
3.16 UKGI went beyond standard levels of disclosure by providing investors with a 
model to forecast the cash flows on a ‘non-reliance basis’ to help its analysis. This 
was necessary because income-contingent loans are a novel asset and some of the 
information required to adequately model future repayments is not publicly available. 
UKGI and the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD) analysts produced this model 
(known as the transaction-based earnings & repayments model (TERM)), after reviewing 
a number of alternative options. External advisers quality-assured TERM, and it included 
a review by the credit rating agencies.
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3.17 TERM differs from the model the Department uses for accounting purposes 
(known as the stochastic earnings pathway (StEP)). TERM forecasts repayments of 
the loans sold to investors while StEP forecasts repayments for the total population 
of student loans. Back-testing showed that TERM was more accurate than StEP at 
forecasting repayments of the sold loans.16 This is because StEP is fitted to a population 
with a constant supply of new borrowers, but the sold loans represent a closed pool 
which will deplete over time as borrowers pay off their loans and, as a result, reduce 
the credit quality of the remaining pool. 
3.18 The different designs of the two models means they produce different forecasts 
of the future cash flows. TERM forecasts the future cash flows of the sold loans at 
£2.3 billion,17 which is £261 million below the expected cash flows using StEP.18 
A comparison of TERM’s predicted and actual cash flows have shown to be reasonably 
accurate to date and within the 5% tolerance level the Department set. In addition to 
the back-testing, the Department and UKGI tested the accuracy of the model twice: 
TERM was 0.9%19 above actuals in October 2017 and 4.9%20 below in March 2018. 
This deviation is within tolerance levels but it highlights the uncertainty in estimating 
future cash flows. More information on the two models is provided in Appendix Four.
Testing competitive tension
3.19 The securitisation structure was tested with more than 20 investors prior to the 
February 2017 announcement. Subsequently, just under 200 investors expressed 
interest in the transaction and UKGI, together with its joint lead managers and the SLC, 
met more than 60 investors face-to-face.
3.20 Demand and competitive tension was subsequently confirmed during the 
book-building process, which checks investors’ price and volume interest prior to 
pricing the tranches. The joint lead managers started the book-building process on 
28 November 2017. They recorded £300 million of investor interest after day one and 
£690 million after day two. By the third day overall demand exceeded the size of the 
offering, and by the final day, on 5 December 2017, the order book was 187% of the 
total notes on offer. This strong level of demand enabled the government to improve 
the pricing terms during the book-building phase (Figure 15 and Figure 16).
3.21 Figure 16 illustrates the evolution of the pricing terms during the book-building 
phase and the expected return investors would make at the time of pricing. The prices 
are expressed as a percentage of the face value of the sold loans. The returns are based 
on the characteristics of the notes (Figure 14) and the expected future cash flows from 
UKGI’s financial model (TERM). Against the face value, the final sale achieved 48 pence 
(48.47%) for every £1 of student loans sold and, on average, provides investors an 
expected annual return at pricing of 6.5%.
16 Back-testing is a process of verifying the predictive accuracy of a financial model by using historical data.
17 The cash flows excludes 5% that is retained by the Department to comply with EU securitisation requirements.
18 Note: the net present value under both models uses the discount rate for accounting purposes (RPI+0.7%).
19 Based on annual numbers.
20 Based on interim numbers.
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Figure 15 shows Overview of the order book
Figure 15 shows Overview of the order book
Figure 15
Overview of the order book
The order book had an overall subscription of 187%
Tranches Face value
(£m)
Investor 
orders
(£m)
Percentage 
covered
(%)
Number of investors 
placing orders
A1 810.6 1,050 130 23
A2 697.1 1,290 185 17
B 120.6 320 265 9
X 1,919.1 3,980 207 10
3,547.4 6,640 187
Notes
1 The order book is the composition of investors’ price and volume interest prior to pricing the tranches.
2 Face value is the total outstanding balance of loans issued to students plus any interest that has accrued, 
less any repayments. 
3 Percentage covered is the investor orders divided by the face value. 
Source: UK Government Investments
Figure 16
Development of price guidance to fi nal pricing
The final pricing reached improved throughout the book-building phase 
Tranches Initial price 
thoughts
(28 Nov 2017)
(%)
First price 
guidance
(4 Dec 2017)
(%)
Final pricing
(6 Dec 2017)
(%)
Estimated 
investor return 
(6 Dec 2017)
(%)
A1 98.60 area 98.60–99.30 99.03 2.3
A2 88.80–90.80 91.00–93.10 93.12 3.3
B 84.50 area 84.50–86.50 86.55 6.0
X 7.00–8.00 8.00–8.50 8.50 13.1
Weighted average [48.47] 6.5
Notes
1 Book-building is a systematic process of generating, capturing and recording investor demand for securities during 
their issuance process, in order to support effi cient price discovery.
2 The numbers in the table represent the price investors are offered/paid and is expressed as a percentage of face 
value. For example, for the X tranche, the investor paid 8.5 pence for every £1 of loans sold by the government 
and for the A1 tranche, the investor paid 99.03 pence for every £1 of loans sold by the government.
3 Estimated investor return – this is an estimate of the returns investors are likely to make on the day of pricing 
based on the characteristics of the tranche and the cash fl ow forecasted in the model assuming the government’s 
base case economic forecast as of March 2017.
Source: UK Government Investments, National Audit Offi ce analysis
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Figure 17 shows Main external parties involved in the sale of student loans
Adviser costs
3.22 The Department used a wide range of advisers in order to prepare for and sell this 
novel asset. Figure 17 lists the advisers and their roles.
Figure 17
Main external parties involved in the sale of student loans
Department of Education made use of a wide range of advisers
Main parties Firm Role
Sales adviser/arranger Barclays Bank Provided advice on potential sale structures, potential 
investors and information requirements from Student 
Loan company (SLC)/HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC). 
Managed all interaction with potential investors as 
‘arranger’ of the securitisation. 
Independent adviser NM Rothschild 
& Sons
Provided third-party challenge to the sales adviser and 
reviewed their advice and recommendations. Advisor 
on the feasibility study.
Transaction reviewer J.P. Morgan Reviewed, challenged and commented on the sales 
structure, materials and investor list. Appointed 
pre-launch to provide additional structuring input 
on the securitisation structure. 
Vendor assistance Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers
Provided advice and on-site assistance to SLC and 
HMRC on servicing data, systems and processes.
Legal adviser Hogan Lovells Provided legal advice on the feasibility study 
and the sale, including the transaction structure, 
documentation, legal due diligence and statutory 
framework. Additionally provided tax opinion.
Model adviser Government 
Actuary’s 
Department 
Provided advice, a model, skills and resources to UK 
Government Investments (UKGI) in order to ensure that 
the model used for predicting student loan repayments 
was as accurate as possible.
Insurance adviser Ernst & Young Provided advice on the insurance regulatory aspects 
of the structuring, including providing a report to 
potential investors on the likely regulatory treatment 
under Solvency II. 
Tax adviser Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers
Reviewed and commented on some of the tax 
aspects of the transaction structure.
Joint lead manager(s) Barclays, 
Credit Suisse, 
J.P. Morgan 
and Lloyds
Priced and distributed securities to investors as part 
of the sales process. 
Buy-side securitisation 
adviser 
Third-party 
consultancy
Provided independent views on the structure 
and process.
Ratings agency(s) Fitch Ratings, 
Standard and 
Poor’s
Rating agencies are not advisers, they do not provide 
advice. They conducted analysis of the loans to 
provide a credit rating for the A and B notes.
Source: Full business case
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Figure 18 shows Transaction costs
3.23 The Department used more than 10 advisers, incurring related fees of more 
than £15 million (Figure 18) and estimated total transaction costs of £23 million when 
approximate government spend on headcount is included. Advisers were engaged 
on a combination of fixed and success-based fees. Given the numerous delays in the 
process – most of which were outside of the project team’s control – costs were higher 
than expected at the outset when HM Treasury announced a sale in 2013.
3.24 The transaction reviewer, independent adviser and buy-side securitisation adviser 
provided complimentary functions of reviewing and challenging the securitisation 
structure. While the scope of the advisers’ work covered similar areas, it provides the 
Department with additional assurance on the sales advisers’ proposed strategy which 
was valuable considering the novelty of the transactions. The additional cost of this 
assurance was marginal but over time, as the government and investors become more 
familiar with this financial instrument, not all advisers may be required.
Figure 18
Transaction costs
Advisers’ costs equate to approximately two-thirds of the total transaction costs incurred 
since 2013-14
Spend type Expenditure
2013-14 to 2015-16
(£m)
2016-17 
(£m)
2017-18 
(£m) 
Total
(£m)
External advisers (includes 
£0.7m stamp duty)
5.2 3.1 7.4 15.7
Estimated internal costs 4.5 1.3 1.3 7.1
Total 9.7 4.4 8.7 22.8
Note
1 Costs incurred before the original business case in 2013-14 have not been provided. 
Source: Full business case, UK Government Investments
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Appendix One
Our audit approach
1 This study examined the value for money of the first sale of income-contingent 
student loans. We reviewed the preparation, process and proceeds of the transaction 
to opine on:
• the main outcomes of the sale;
• how government assessed value for money in the decision to sell; and
• how UK Government Investments (UKGI) managed the transaction to sell 
student loans.
2 Figure 19 gives our evaluative criteria. Our evidence base is described in 
Appendix Two.
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Figure 19 shows Our audit approach
Figure 19
Our audit approach
The objective of 
government
How this will 
be achieved
Our study
Our evaluative 
criteria
Our evidence
(see Appendix Two 
for details)
Our conclusions
• We interviewed officials in UKGI and the Department and reviewed their advice to ministers.
• We reviewed the business cases and the analysis provided by advisers and also interviewed them.
Preparation
Were the disposal options 
and timing of these options 
assessed appropriately?
Proceeds
Have the proceeds been 
maximised? An expectation 
of this being repeated for 
the remaining programme?
Process
Was the process effective 
to support the objectives of 
the transaction?
In 2008, HM Treasury (HMT) and the Department for Education (the Department) agreed the following objectives, 
to reduce public sector net debt, to ensure there was no detrimental impact on borrowers and to achieve value 
for money. In 2017, the government announced the first in a programme of sales to dispose of a portion of the 
Income-Contingent Repayment Plan 1 student loan book. The sales aimed to raise £12 billion by 2020-21. 
The first sale completed on the 13 December 2017 with proceeds of £1.7 billion.
HMT set the objectives for the sale and the value-for-money framework to be applied to the sale, which the 
Department agreed to. The Department as the accountable officer for the sale engaged UKGI to sell the assets 
as it is the ‘centre of excellence’ for asset sales in government. UKGI considered different sale options, market 
conditions and investor demand. It aimed to maximise the price for the notes while ensuring no students 
would be affected by the new purchaser of the loans, as they have no ability to effect repayment.
The study examined whether the sale secured value for money.
The sale of student loans was conducted under government’s policy to sell assets where there is no policy 
reason for continued public ownership. In this context UKGI prepared well for the sale, creating a structure which 
encouraged investor interest and maintained competitive tension during the process. The value of the loans is 
subject to a high level of uncertainty, but UKGI’s estimates of what investors would pay were reasonable, and the 
sale achieved prices at the upper end of these estimates. In terms of the preparation, process and proceeds of the 
transaction itself UKGI has achieved value for money. 
But the sale of student loans also shows limitations in the way that government assesses value for money and 
measures the costs of student loans over time. The Department uses one set of assumptions for the cost of student 
loans when they are added to government’s balance sheet, and HM Treasury uses another set of assumptions in 
support of its decision to sell them. This offers two different ways of calculating the subsidy to, and value of, its rapidly 
growing student loan portfolio. The two approaches give different answers which risks government: not knowing with 
enough certainty the cost to the taxpayer of student loans when they are issued; and of selling assets too cheaply 
relative to their long-term value despite achieving its objective of reducing public sector net debt.
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Appendix Two
Our evidence base
1 Our conclusion was reached following an analysis of evidence collected between 
January and May 2018. Our main methods are outlined below:
Document review
2 We reviewed key documents including:
• the Department for Education’s (the Department’s) annual reports;
• letters between accounting officers of the Department and HM Treasury 
and their predecessors;
• the original and final business cases;
• submissions to ministers seeking authority to proceed;
• information obtained from the transaction’s data room that was shared 
with investors;
• presentations to investors, servicing and collection presentation, investor 
prospectus and legal documentation, credit rating agency reports;
• the UK Government Investments’ (UKGI’s) valuation model and independent 
valuation report; 
• the different models used to predict student loan repayments;
• records of the progress of book-building and allocations of notes;
• contracts between the Department and its advisers; and
• adviser documentation, which included assurance reports, model review, 
update reports, readiness review and market testing advice.
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Interviews
• we interviewed officials at HM Treasury, the Department, and UKGI. We also 
discussed the sale with the Students Loans Company and the Government 
Actuary’s Department; and
• we interviewed the advisers involved in the sale.
Quantitative analysis
• we examined the different models and assumptions; and
• we analysed the valuation approaches and the methods underpinning them.
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Appendix Three
Accounting treatment
1 National Accounts and the Department for Education (the Department) accounts 
report information on student loans each year. The Office for National Statistics produces 
the National Accounts to record the UK’s economic activity to statistical standards on a 
consistent basis with international comparators. The government values the sold loans 
at £3.5 billion on the National Accounts, while the Department records the same assets 
at £2.6 billion on Departmental Accounts.
2 The difference arises because the National Accounts reflect the nominal value21 
of the loans issued, whereas the Departmental Accounts applies International 
Accounting Standards and takes into account that not all loans will be repaid. 
The Department writes off a large proportion of loans in the year issued and makes 
appropriate adjustments in subsequent years, as it does not expect the loans to be 
repaid in full. The National Accounts are not required to incur the same write-off until 
the end of the repayment terms; for the loans sold this is when the borrower reaches 
65 years of age.
3 Due to the different accounting frameworks, the National Accounts and 
Department accounts also treat and present the sale differently. The Department 
records a sale of £2.6 billion worth of assets for proceeds of £1.7 billion, representing 
a loss on the sale totalling £865 million. The Department must record this loss to comply 
with the required accounting framework, which has an adverse effect on its financial 
position and performance.
4 Despite the National Accounts recording the same asset at £3.5 billion, it records 
no loss on the sale. This is because the different accounting framework does not require 
a loss to be recognised; instead, the assets are revalued at the sale figure of £1.7 billion.
5 The sale also avoids the National Accounts having to write off the loans, as 
the Department does when it issues the loans, because they are moved off the 
National Accounts before they are cancelled at the end of their repayment terms. 
This, understandably, means that the Department does not have the same incentive 
to sell student loans as HM Treasury.
21 Nominal value = face value + accrued interest – repayments (of principal and interest) – loan cancellations.
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6 The Department sought assurance from HM Treasury that any loss incurred 
from loan sales would not have an impact on its budget. HM Treasury advised the 
Department that any loss would not affect future budgets. While the Department is 
responsible for the sales’ value for money, HM Treasury initiated the decision to sell. 
The Department has been proactive and engaged on matters regarding the accounting 
impact, dating back to the first discussions in 2007.
Fiscal position
7 The government reduced public sector net debt (PSND) by £1.7 billion through 
the sale (Figure 20 overleaf). PSND only recognises assets if they are cash or ‘near 
cash’. Thus, the financing of the original issuance of student loans will have impacted 
PSND (through either the liability of the gilts issued or a decrease in the government’s 
liquid assets) but the student loan assets are not recorded within the PSND aggregate. 
In turn, when they are sold only the positive impacts of increased cash are recognised, 
not the corresponding loss of an asset worth £3.5 billion. 
8 PSND is only one measure of national debt available from the National Accounts. 
An alternative measure, public sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL), provides a different 
view of the sale. HM Treasury introduced PSNFL as it gives a broader view of national 
debt than PSND. PSNFL takes account of a number of assets that PSND does not, 
including student loans. However, PSNFL does not show the Department’s planned 
subsidy of student loans – when the Department issued the loans, it did not expect 
them all to be repaid.22 As such, the impairment that the Department applies on its 
accounts is not included in the National Accounts through PSND or PSNFL. The Office 
for National Statistics is aware of this and has commenced some work with the 
international statistical community to consider whether this remains the most appropriate 
statistical treatment of student loans, given their income-contingent nature.23
9 PSND is limited in its scope, providing a narrow view of debt. HM Treasury’s 
continued focus on PSND as a measure has been criticised in the past. The Treasury 
Committee24 warned that selling these loans does not improve the government’s 
financial position, and the Office for Budget Responsibility and the International 
Monetary Fund have described government asset sales that reduce the net debt as 
a fiscal illusion.25 Although the government’s objective is to reduce PSND, it should 
have reviewed this before the sale, considering the impact on alternative measures 
such as PSNFL.
10 The use of PSND in this first sale of student loans has allowed the sale to be 
successful in achieving its objective of reducing national debt, despite the government 
exchanging £3.5 billion worth of assets for £1.7 billion.
22 Government estimates that 65% to 70% of loans issued before 2012 and 55% to 60% of loans issued after 
2012 will be repaid.
23 Office for National Statistics, Public sector finances, UK: March 2018, 24 April 2018, section 14.
24 Treasury Committee, Student Loans, Seventh Report of Session 2017–2019, HC 478, House of Commons, 
February 2018.
25 Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and fiscal outlook, November 2017.
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Figure 20 shows The effects of the sale on PSND and PSNFL
11  The government benefits further from the sale when considering the deficit, 
with the National Accounts avoiding significant impairments which would be incurred 
at maturity. Once the sale programme is complete, the National Accounts will have 
avoided £13.1 billion of impairments.26 The government recognises this write-off as 
a purposeful design feature of student loans, and that it represents a significant cost 
of higher education funding to the government. The sale clears a substantial cost to 
the government of higher education off the deficit, not faithfully representing the true 
cost at the National Accounts level. If the government extends the sales programme 
to post-2012 student loans, the deficit may exclude further costs of higher education 
of at least £14 billion.27 
26 These are the impairments recognised on the income-contingent loans 1 held as at 31 March 2017 – meaning this is 
the minimum impairment which the government will avoid when selling.
27 These are the impairments recognised on the income-contingent loans 2 held as at 31 March 2017 – meaning this is 
the minimum impairment which the government will avoid when selling. 
Figure 20
The effects of the sale on PSND and PSNFL
The impact of the sale differs substantially according to different measures 
Public sector net debt
(PSND)
(£m)
Public sector net 
financial liabilities 
(PSNFL)
(£m)
Student loan contribution 
before the sale1
– (3,547) 
Sale
£1,719 million cash received 
for £3,547 million loan asset
(1,719) 1,828
No sale
Loans held on National 
Accounts until maturity, 
requiring write-off 2
– 257 – 9633
Notes
1 Student loans are included in PSNFL at nominal value, whereas they are not included in PSND.
2 The National Accounts only require write-off after the end of repayment terms, for example the borrower 
reaches 65 years of age. When the loans mature, the National Accounts will cancel the loans for non-repayment, 
increasing PSNFL.
3 £963 million uses the accounting model (StEP) to estimate write-offs and assumes no further impairment in the 
Department’s accounts to the loan book until maturity. £257 million write-off uses the sale model (TERM) to estimate 
future impairments.
Source: Department for Education Annual Report and Accounts 2017-18; National Audit Offi ce analysis of HM Treasury 
debt and liability measures, Offi ce for National Statistics
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Appendix Four
Purpose of the different student loan models
1 In 2013-14, the Department for Education (the Department) modelling team 
(then part of the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills) created the Stochastic 
Earnings Pathway Model (StEP). This model incorporated recommendations from 
the National Audit Office’s 2013 technical report on its former model HERO.28 
The Department developed StEP in order to provide the most accurate valuation 
of all student loans held by government. This also generates the impairment figure 
used in the Department’s financial statements.
2 In 2015, back-testing showed that the StEP model – while fit for the purpose of 
forecasting repayments of the total population of student loans – was less suitable 
for forecasting the repayments of loans to be sold to investors. This is because the 
population within StEP has a constant supply of new borrowers, whereas the individual 
tranches to be sold will deplete over time as higher earners pay off their loans. In turn, 
UK Government Investments and the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD) analysts 
produced TERM to value the net present value of future repayments for loans to be sold 
in the first tranche.
Comparison of assumptions and model mechanisms
3 As such, the model assumptions and mechanisms are designed for their 
respective purposes and so differ in various ways. Figure 21 overleaf explains in 
more detail these differences.
28 Comptroller and Auditor General, Student loan repayments technical paper, Session 2013-14, HC 818, 
National Audit Office, December 2013.
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Figure 21 shows Differences between TERM and StEP
Figure 21
Differences between TERM and StEP
The assumptions and mechanism are designed for different purposes
Modelling Transaction-based earnings & repayments 
model (TERM) 
Stochastic earnings pathway (StEP)
Underlying 
mechanism of 
the model
Markov transitions
Employment:
• the model assesses the probability of remaining 
in employment or moving to employment based 
on a borrower’s current earnings level or number 
of years since their last employment.
Earnings: 
• an individual’s earnings are probabilistically 
driven by the prior year’s earning band; and
• only longer-term memory is used to determine 
earnings band of someone coming out of 
unemployment and is based on their last 
earnings state.
Logistic and linear regressions
Employment:
• the model uses data from the previous three years 
for that specific individual to determine the 
probabilities of each possible employment state 
from the logistic regressions, giving highest 
weighting to the prior year; and
• an employment state is randomly assigned to the 
individual based on these probabilities.
Earnings:
• the model uses data from the previous three years 
for an individual to calculate earnings from the 
linear regressions, giving highest weighting to 
the prior year; and
• earnings are perturbed from the value derived 
from the linear regressions, based on a random 
selection from a normal distribution.
Data to set 
assumptions
Sale cohort-specific Student Loans Company 
(SLC) data is used. When creating the transition 
probabilities at older ages, as SLC data is limited, it 
is overlaid by HM Revenue & Customs data on the 
wider tax-paying base. 
SLC data (1998–2014), British Household survey 
(1991–2009), Labour Force survey (2001–2014) 
and Destinations of Leavers of Higher Education 
(2005, 2009).
Population Population being forecasted is borrowers with a 
latest statutory repayment due date of 2002 to 2006.
The residual individuals who have not fully repaid 
their student loan and therefore are anticipated to 
not be the highest earners.
All borrowers with balances outstanding.
Gender There is no difference in treatment between men and 
women when assessing the transition probabilities.
There are different coefficients used for each gender 
which influence earnings and employment status.
Age Age impacts on the transition probabilities. Age impacts the employment likelihood and earnings of 
an individual.
Actual age is also combined with graduation age to 
provide a weighted age that more appropriately affects 
an individual’s circumstances.
Historical 
individual data 
used to develop 
employment and 
earnings status
Each individual in the population is 10 years plus 
post-Statutory Repayment Date and therefore it 
is not required to produce a position for a new or 
relatively new loan holder.
Only current earnings and age rather than any 
higher education information is factored into 
transition probabilities.
The StEP model considers an individual’s earnings 
potential and employment status to be dependent and 
therefore modelled on the following three criteria:
• the type of higher education institution attended;
• degree subject studied; and
• degree level achieved, including completion.
This is only in the short term, until the actual position 
for that individual starts to become available in SLC 
data for the specific individual.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis
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